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Abstract:
Braun (The ecological rationality of historical costs and conservatism. Accounting, Economics and Law: A Con-
vivium, this issue) argues that the traditional accounting principles underlying the revenue-expense approach
such as Historical Cost and Conservatism are ecologically rational in that they help organizations survive bet-
ter in uncertain economic environments. More importantly, Braun argues that the revenue-expense approach
generates new private information, which informs markets and makes them more eﬀective (Hayek, 1945, The
use of knowledge in society. The American Economic Review, 35(4), 519–530), as opposed tomerely reﬂecting back
market data under the asset-liability approach (e.g. Sunder, 2011, IFRS monopoly: The Pied Piper of ﬁnancial
reporting. Accounting and Business Research, 41(3), 291–306). We try to explicate the nature of the new private
information generated jointly by Historical Cost and Conservatism, and how this information facilitates the
survival of individual entrepreneurs and organizations in market competition.
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I have two basic propositions that directly bear on accounting: (1) Accounting is an integral part of the
structure of every organization, and (2) a fundamental understanding ofwhy accounting practices evolve
as they do and how to improve them requires a deeper understanding about organizations than now
exists in the social sciences.
Jensen (1983, p. 319)
It is important to remain sensitive to the fact that human institutions and most decision making is not
guided primarily, if at all, by constructivism. Emergent arrangements, even if initially constructivist in
form,must have survival properties that take account of opportunity costs and environmental challenges
invisible to our modeling eﬀorts.
Smith (2003, p. 468)
Financial reporting is not an end in itself but is intended to provide information that is useful in mak-
ing business and economic decisions – for making reasoned choices among alternative uses of scarce
resources in the conduct of business and economic activities.
Financial Accounting Standards Board (2008, Paragraph 9)
SudiptaBasu is the corresponding author.
© 2017Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.
This content is free.
1
Brought to you by | Chapman University
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/19/17 12:23 AM
A
ut
om
at
ic
al
ly
ge
ne
ra
te
d
ro
ug
h
PD
F
by
Pr
oo
fC
he
ck
fr
om
R
iv
er
Va
lle
y
Te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
Lt
d
Basu andWaymire DEGRUYTER
1 Introduction
Braun (this issue) synthesizes and extends previous arguments for why aspects of the revenue-expense ap-
proach to accounting, which emerged in practice before the advent of modern regulation, are valuable for
individuals and markets. He argues that accounting principles such as Historical Cost and Conservatism are
similar to widespread human behavior captured in neuroscience and behavioral economics (e. g. Dickhaut et
al., 2010; Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2009), that evolved by trial-and-error adaptation over millions of years. His ma-
jor insight is that the revenue-expense approach provides new private data to the capital market that informs
security prices (Hayek, 1945). In pulling these strands together, Braun (this issue) builds a cogent argument
for why the current monopolistic regulators of accounting, with their preference for an asset-liability approach
coupled with fair value measurement, could harm the long-term survival of ﬁrms and markets, similar to Basu
and Waymire (2008, 2010) , Dye and Sunder (2001) .
Barker and Penman (2016) argue that choices between accounting methods such as capitalizing versus ex-
pensing or amortization versus impairment are driven by variation in realization uncertainty, which is the like-
lihood that current expenditures will eventually generate revenues. Although realized cash ﬂows are always
recorded, the treatment of unrealized future cash ﬂows varies across Historical Cost, Conservatism and Fair
Value measurement bases. Unrealized cash ﬂows are never (always) recorded under pure Historical Cost (pure
Fair Value) measurement, while only negative unrealized cash ﬂows (unrealized losses) are recorded under
pure Conditional Conservatism (Basu, 1997; Bliss, 1924, p. 110).1
In this essay, we argue that the adaptive value of Historical Cost and Conditional Conservatism (hereafter
Conservatism) depends critically on their interactionwith one another in helping identify, classify, and estimate
opportunity costs, which are important for a ﬁrm’s survival. These estimates constitute local knowledge, which
through the trading activities of households and ﬁrms feed into prices and help product markets clear, even
though none of the participants fully grasp the production and distribution system of the economy a.k.a. the
knowledge problem (Hayek, 1945). Although Braun cogently argues why accounting principles such as Histori-
cal Cost and Conservatism beneﬁt both individuals and securities markets, he does not explicitly develop the
arguments for why ﬁrms beneﬁt from these principles.
The key to our argument is to recognize that most ﬁrms generate value from exchange transactions spread
over time, often measured as the operating cycle (time to convert inventory to cash) and the trade or cash con-
version cycle (time from payment for raw materials bought on credit to collection of cash from credit sales). In
reviewing choices that span multiple periods, it is not enough to compare outcomes to expectations in just the
last period, as Fair Valuemeasurementswould. Rather,we have to jointly analyze actions and outcomes in the ﬁ-
nal, intermediate and initial periods. Historical Cost transaction data provide thememory to estimate themulti-
period net beneﬁt, which helps entrepreneurs discover better current actions. Absent transaction records that
detail why past choices were made, entrepreneurs use heuristics like “sunk cost” to identify better choices. Fur-
ther, Conservatism through impairments provides accounting “markers” of avoidable transactions that reduce
survival prospects on average. Through this on-going local decision-making, ﬁnancing ﬂows toward higher
valued investments and economic eﬀiciency improves, enabling higher growth and increased welfare. These
eﬀects are reinforced by the contracting eﬀiciencies engendered by Historical Cost and Conservatism (e. g. Ball,
1989).
We describe the three building blocks of our argument – the knowledge problem, opportunity cost, and
accounting principles – in the next three sections and how they arise from the interactions of individuals, or-
ganizations, and markets. We next explain how Historical Cost and Conservatism jointly help ﬁrms improve
their survival odds, discuss the implications of our argument for accounting regulation,and ﬁnally conclude.
2 The knowledge problem
As Braun (this issue) discusses, neoclassical economic theory generates testable predictions by making strong
assumptions including perfect competition, complete markets, costless information, infallible memory, unlim-
ited computing power, and omniscient and maximizing actors with stable and well-shaped preferences. Under
these assumptions, general equilibrium theory shows that the market system will eﬀiciently utilize resources
and maximize social welfare. The knowledge problem is that actual market participants know little because infor-
mation is costly to procure and process. Thus, the standardmodels predict thatmarket economies are ineﬀicient
because uninformed real-life market participants will choose poorly.
In these models, utility-generating consumption occurs only in households while only proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms
produce. These assumptions let a researcher calculate and prescribe the optimal decisions for each actor in the
model, and predict equilibrium outcomes for the system (Walras, 1874). Single-period general equilibrium is
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generalized to multi-period general equilibrium by assuming that all goods can be bought or sold for delivery
on any future date at any speciﬁc location (Arrow & Debreu, 1954; McKenzie, 1954). Given a complete set of
state-contingent prices, individuals choose today for both today and all future periods.
These assumptions are ideal rather than realistic, but Friedman (1953) argued that this is not fatal for eco-
nomic analysis if the resulting theory predicts well. Stated diﬀerently, the stylized assumptions of neoclassical
economic theory constitute a coherent set of suﬀicient conditions for the existence of general equilibrium, but
none of them may be necessary. For example, Tintner (1941a, 1941b) observed that maximizing behavior is
meaningless in an uncertain or ambiguous world (Knight, 1921) while Simon (1956), p.129 argued, “Evidently,
organisms adapt well enough to ‘satisﬁce’; they do not, in general, ‘optimize’.” However, Alchian (1950) and
Becker (1962) showed that many economic laws will hold even if consumers do not maximize utility or ﬁrms
do not maximize proﬁts. Similarly, Gode and Sunder (1993, 1997) demonstrated that ‘zero-intelligence’ traders
achieve competitive equilibrium and allocative eﬀiciency in experimental markets because the rules of themar-
ketplace substitute for individual rationality in generating eﬀicient outcomes (Coase, 1988; Sunder, 2004). More
broadly, the Smith (1776) invisible hand argument showed that people do not have to be altruistic (a suﬀicient
condition) to beneﬁt others through market exchanges.
However, the unrealistic assumptions cause trouble if and when the theoretical solutions are implemented
(e. g. Coase, 1982; Simon, 1978). In the early twentieth century, many economists believed that planned socialist
economies could outperform market economies if experts solved simultaneously the Walrasian equations of
demand and supply, and thus, coordinated production plans (e. g. Barone, 1908).2 However, Hayek (1935) ob-
served that no individual or small group could know anywhere near all the demand and supply data needed to
compute themillions of production plans for all the initial, intermediate and ﬁnal products in even a small econ-
omy. Buchanan (1979) and Schelling (1978) pointed out that general equilibrium theory assumes that people
have stable preferences, and thus, cannot learn and develop, which is clearly unrealistic. Similarly, the assump-
tion of known production technology implies that technology cannot change, but technological innovation is
the crucial ingredient for economic growth in the Schumpeter (1942) gale of creative destruction or the Solow
growth model (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956).
If neoclassical price theory describes market economies poorly, then how do consumers and producers co-
ordinate without expert guidance? Hayek (1945) explains that the price mechanism coordinates plans without
requiring centralized knowledge or intensive computation. People choose between current and future con-
sumption (i. e. saving), using interest rates and other forward prices to benchmark their decisions. Each person
buys or sells a product using her knowledge of localdemand and supply conditions. Consumers choose between
substitute products (e. g. diﬀerent vegetables) by comparing each one’s expected value with the purchase price,
accounting for any synergies in consumption (e. g. recipes). Prices change to clear local markets, but prices for a
given product vary geographically because of transportation costs, local taxes, customer accessibility and other
factors, especially information costs that hinder arbitrage (Stigler, 1961).
Individuals play an important dual role as producers that is largely ignored in general equilibrium theory,
which onlymodels ﬁrms (Demsetz, 1983). However, ﬁrms are composed of people, so both demand and supply
ultimately reﬂect individuals’ choices. People choose whether and howmuch to participate in the market econ-
omy, work outside it (e. g. running a household and raising a family) and/or enjoy leisure (e. g. in retirement).
If people produce for the market, they choose whether to run their own businesses as entrepreneurs or join
another business as partners or employees. Joining another business trades oﬀ some rights to make production
decisions for potentially more stable income (Coase, 1937).
A producer’s decision problem is more diﬀicult if the production process extends across several periods
and future selling prices are uncertain (e. g. a farm), and even more complicated when intermediate products
can be bought and sold. The multi-period decision problem is simpler for monopolists, who can estimate the
beneﬁts and costs of each available production opportunity based on their own past experience (and not worry
about competing producers).Monopolists study current prices (and forward prices if available) alongwith fore-
casts of future demand to make their production plans, which supplemented by the activities of commodities
speculators ensures that future demand is met (Coase & Fowler, 1937; Muth, 1961).
Market competition complicates an individual producer’s decision fundamentally. Although aware of their
own production opportunities and those of some local competitors, producers learn that they cannot accurately
predict market outcomes, and hence, their fortunes. Competition gives entrepreneurs very strong incentives to
discover new ways to make the same products more cheaply or make new higher quality products (Sowell,
1980). That is, producers trade oﬀ the net beneﬁts of exploiting existing technologies, imitating competitors’
innovations, and exploring and implementing altogether new production techniques. The more intense the
competition (i. e. the harder current competitors and potential entrants are trying to innovate), the more im-
portant it is to discover and accurately assess new opportunities to keep the organization viable (Hayek, 1968).3
At the same time, competition between current and potential employees in the market sector ensures that ﬁrms
can use incentive schemes to motivate current employees to work more eﬀectively.4 “Thus, market competition
3
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allows proﬁtable ﬁrms to grow and causes unproﬁtable ones to wither, forcing them to produce something
diﬀerent” (Coase & Wang, 2012, p. 71).
Firms aremore than just groups of individuals and can only compete against specialized individual produc-
ers by reducing overall contracting costs (Coase, 1937). As islands of planning in a market economy, ﬁrms do
not use market prices to guide internal transactions, since that would assume away any competitive advantage
versus specialized individual producers. Ball (1989) conceives of a ﬁrm as “a specialist contracting intermedi-
ary, intermediating between consumers and suppliers of factors of production, exploiting scale economies in
repetitive contracting by centralizing contracting in one institution. Firms engage in non-market contracting,
on their own internal terms (here labeled “quasi-prices”). These are not market prices and need not resemble
market prices in either form or magnitude; and market prices are not suﬀicient to guide ﬁrms’ decisions.” Fur-
ther, “accounting is viewed as a specialist function for providing information that assists ﬁrms in establishing
their quasi-prices, or even for providing the quasi-prices themselves.”
Similarly, Sunder (1997, p. 1) argues, “We can think of each organization as a set of contracts among employ-
ees, customers, managers, shareholders, suppliers, auditors, etc. Each party seeks its goals through exchange of
resources with the organization. Accounting helps implement and enforce this contract set by tracking resource
inﬂows and outﬂows, furnishing information about fulﬁllment of contracts by various parties, distributing in-
formation to attract new participants in the organization, and by making some information public to reduce
the risk of conﬂict and deadlock at the time of contract renegotiation.” Biondi (2005), Ijiri (1983), Jensen (1983),
and Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and others make similar arguments.
The next three sections explore what information internal quasi-prices should contain to enable more
proﬁtable decisions and greater contracting eﬀiciency and how traditional accounting principles can help pro-
duce this information for managers and other parties.
3 Opportunity cost
Standard decision theory prescribes that we identify all potential solutions to a problem, compare the net value
(beneﬁts less costs) of each solution, and choose the solution with the highest expected net value. The net
value of the second highest ranked option constitutes the opportunity cost of the chosen option, and represents
the value of the best option forgone when making mutually exclusive choices. Importantly, the net value or
net beneﬁt of an option is not restricted to the tangible products foregone or their monetary exchange values,
but also includes implicit lost time, pleasure, or anything else that provides utility to the decision maker(s).
Active consideration of opportunity costs helps ensure that scarce resources are used eﬀiciently, which in turn
increases economic proﬁt for a ﬁrm or net surplus for a society.5
Given the long history of the opportunity cost concept, it has been described as “simple, straightforward and
widely understood” (Buchanan, 1987, p. 719).6However, it turns out to be quite subtle and oftenmisunderstood.
Ferraro and Taylor (2005) surveyed 199 economists and Ph.D. students at the Allied Social Science Associations
(ASSA) annual meeting to test their understanding of opportunity cost using this multiple choice question:
Youwon a free ticket to see an Eric Clapton concert (which has no resale value). Bob Dylan is performing
on the same night and is your next-best alternative activity. A ticket to see Dylan will cost $40. On any
given day, you would be willing to pay up to $50 to see Dylan. Assume there are no other costs of seeing
either performer. Based on this information, what is the opportunity cost of seeing Eric Clapton? A $0,
B $10, C $40, D $50.
Ferraro and Taylor (2005) argue that the net value of seeing Dylan is $10 ($50 utility less $40 ticket price),
which by deﬁnition is the opportunity cost of seeing Eric Clapton, since seeing Dylan is your next-best alter-
native. The tallies of the economists’ survey responses were A: 50, B: 43, C: 51, D: 55, i. e., almost randomly
distributed. Even worse, the economists chose the correct answer B the least often. Poor training was not an
issue since 83 economists had earned their doctorates at “top 30” economics schools, while 120 had taught the
economics principles course. The survey results show that the opportunity cost concept is ambiguous. The same
scenario was used in a survey of 358 undergraduate economics students, 76 percent of whom had already taken
an economics class. Only 7.4 % (17.2 %) of students who had previously taken an (no) economics class picked
the correct answer B. The latter survey results show that the opportunity cost concept is not intuitive. Parkin
(2016, pp. 12–13) explains that the confusion may arise from economics textbooks deﬁning opportunity cost as
either the physical quantity foregone (seeing Dylan) or the value foregone ($10), which produce identical solu-
tions only in competitive equilibrium (Knight, 1934, 663–664).7 Thus, the frequent wrong responses partially
reﬂect the inconsistency in how the concept is envisioned and taught. However, this conceptual ambiguity does
not undercut the importance of opportunity costs in making decisions.
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As Braun (this issue) discusses, opportunity cost is used by some ﬁnancial accounting theorists to justify
current ﬁnancial reporting standards. Speciﬁcally, when an asset is bought, its explicit opportunity cost is its
entry value as measured by the cash payment or equivalent (since the opportunity cost is the value of an alter-
native asset the money could have been used to buy), i. e., the original historical cost. When an asset is being
used in production, its explicit opportunity cost is the dollar value of its next best use, which can be estimated
by its exit value, that is, the best price for which it could be sold (e. g. Ronen, 2008, p. 186), unless there is a
better internal use. When a production asset is sold, its explicit opportunity cost is the present value of the net
beneﬁts it would generate if it were used in the business, which can be estimated by extrapolating the current
cash ﬂows generated using the asset, discounted to the present. For assets produced for sale (i. e. inventory),
the opportunity cost is the second highest price oﬀered by prospective buyers. Fair value accounting can be
viewed as providing an ongoing estimate of the opportunity cost of using an asset, and in a zero transaction
cost world, helps capital providers assess how eﬀiciently capital is used on a period-by-period basis assuming
that managers always maximize proﬁts correctly. However, Ball (1975) observes that under perfect and complete
markets, historical cost, replacement cost, realizable value and present value are identical, so debates over the
best estimate are empty!
Opportunity cost is studied more deeply in managerial accounting and cost accounting, which examine
how real-world managers can use accounting data (including non-ﬁnancial data) to choose well. Managers
operating in an ambiguous world, where discovering proﬁtable transactions is costly, survive in competition
using heuristics like satisﬁcing behavior (Alchian, 1950; Simon, 1956). In a world with non-zero transactions costs,
a uniform reporting period is less relevant to managers than the product-speciﬁc operating and trade cycles,
which are their true decision-making periods. Managers seek to recover through sales more than the resources
consumed in production, since a ﬁrm that continually loses money will fail. Managers must match against
a sale all costs incurred to generate the sale so that the net beneﬁt can be estimated and compared to those
generated from other products. A common monetary unit makes it easier to compare multiple transactions
using diﬀerent resources, and thus, opportunity cost is better measured as the value foregone (rather than the
physical quantity foregone) for most managerial decisions.
4 Accounting principles and the search for better courses of action
We argue that an accounting system based on Historical Cost and Conservatism provides some vital survival
data on opportunity costs in a costly transacting world. Accounting principles promote learning by generating
outcome data on current and past explorations, which can inform the expected net beneﬁts of future explo-
rations. In this section, we brieﬂy explore the roles of a few diﬀerent historical layers of accounting systems:
recordkeeping, bookkeeping and accounting principles.
Accounting is a process for recording transactions and summarizing their monetary consequences in ﬁnan-
cial statements (and possibly non-ﬁnancial measures and statements), although only regulatory records need
to follow speciﬁc formats. Absent regulation, individuals and ﬁrms will likely beneﬁt from systematically clas-
sifying and organizing related transactions so as to extract meaning from them. Accounting principles guide
us in how to record, classify, and summarize accounting information to construct ﬁnancial statements. Byrne
(1937) explains why an “accounting principle” helps managers run ﬁrms as surviving “going concerns”:
The compelling character of the scientiﬁc laws of health is evident, because to disregard them in the
long run literally results in death. Engineering principles have a coercive character, because to ignore
them in the building of a bridge would probably result in the collapse of the bridge. Such principles are
compelling in the sense that they are in eﬀect self-enforcing; they cannot be disregarded with impunity.
The principles of accounting are also characterized by their coercive or compelling quality because in-
herent in accounting principles are business laws which must be obeyed if in the long run the enterprise
is to survive. This does not mean, of course, that adherence to correct accounting principles is, in itself,
a guarantee of business success; accounting has to do largely with the ﬁnancial policies of business,
and policies of sales, production, labor, and other management problems are important elements in the
success or failure of a business enterprise. It should be apparent, however, that the basing of ﬁnancial
policies upon accounting statements which in tum are not prepared in accordance with fundamentally
right accounting principles, may lead to courses of action which, if too long pursued, will adversely aﬀect
the ﬁnancial health of the business. It is in this sense that the fundamental principles of accounting may
be said to be coercive and self-executory. (emphasis in original)
Until the recent adoption of the asset-liability approach and the move towards Fair Value measurement by
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), ac-
counting practice inmost countrieswas based onHistorical Cost andConservatism. Accounting records started
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being kept at least 10,000 years ago (Mattessich, 1987; Nissen, Damerow & Englund, 1993; Schmandt-Besserat,
1978) and perhaps as far back as 100,000 years ago (Basu, 2015; Henshilwood, d’Errico &Watts, 2009), likely re-
ﬂecting a need to remember more complex exchanges with more partners (Basu &Waymire, 2006). These early
non-written records were physical symbolic representations of agreed-upon payments in kind, which reﬂected
a historical cost orientation in a barter economy. This long history suggests that Historical Cost is likely to be
ecologically rational (Braun, this issue; Waymire & Basu, 2007), but how and why is recording transactions at
Historical Cost useful (in helping ﬁrms survive and prosper)?8
As a starting point, consider the ﬁctional Robinson Crusoe after he was shipwrecked alone on an island
(Defoe, 1719). Crusoe’s island is a one-manproduction economy,with no possibilities for trade,money or prices.
Nevertheless, Crusoe ﬁnds it valuable to record in a journal (Chapter 4) his explorations of the island so that
he can remember where he was more successful in ﬁnding food and hunting animals and birds. Later on he
grows various food crops and domesticates animals, and records where diﬀerent crops grow better or worse
and during which season, which helps him produce food at a sustainable level (Chapters 5, 7). Recording the
initial planting and actual harvest of his various trials lets him estimate the opportunity cost of diﬀerent uses of his time
and labor, and helps Crusoe plan his future activities. The journal also helps Crusoe identify which locations are
infertile or otherwise unsuitable for his eﬀorts. Even though his ink ran out in a few years (Chapter 9), Crusoe
ﬁnds it useful to refer back to the journal during his 27-year sojourn. In other words, the demand for a record of
past interactionswith nature (e.g. lunar calendar to predict tides) could precede even the guidance for exchange
transactions posited by Waymire (2009) .
The preceding discussion also helps explain why individuals attend to sunk costs, which are costs that have
already been incurred and cannot be recovered. Neoclassical economics, which assumes perfect markets and
no information and transaction costs, recommends forgetting all sunk costs and analyzing only future costs
and beneﬁts when making decisions. However, Baliga and Ely (2011) argue that paying attention to sunk costs
is an optimal response to limited memory of all the reasons for initiating a project (that might not be recorded
because they are qualitative or non-monetary), and provide experimental evidence that is consistent with their
argument.9 In other words, once Robinson Crusoe’s ink runs out, he uses heuristics like sunk cost to reconstruct
his unrecorded choices.
After RobinsonCrusoe rescues a stranger, Friday (Chapter 14), they ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to cooperate. Their close
interaction facilitatesmutualmonitoring. However, asmore strangers interact, it is harder tomonitor each other
continuously and detect free-riding and/or cheating in cooperative endeavors. The opportunity cost of dealing
with free riders and cheaters is the net gain that could be earned by instead dealing with trustworthy partners.
Basu et al. (2009) show experimentally that when individuals play an economic game simultaneously with
ﬁve partners over multiple rounds, they do not reliably discriminate between trustworthy and untrustworthy
partners when they cannot keep records. However, if they are allowed to keep records, participants identify and
then avoid or punish uncooperative individuals more eﬀectively, increasing gains from trades and the wealth
of the mini-economy. In other words, historical records also help identify opportunity costs in arms’-length
economic transactions.10Using ethnographic data, Basu, Kirk, andWaymire (2009) show that societies that keep
(even non-written) transaction records develop larger communities with more developed markets, specialized
occupations, and better economic, political, and military outcomes.
When accountants ﬁrst invented writing (c. 3200 BCE), hundreds of goods were being traded, reﬂecting a
complex economy and the emergence of the ﬁrst larger settlements. Related transactionswere soon recorded to-
gether on clay envelopes and tablets (Schmandt-Besserat, 1980), the earliest form of bookkeeping. Various forms
of single-entry bookkeeping emerged worldwide in ancient and medieval civilizations (Littleton & Yamey,
1956), invariably prepared on a Historical Cost basis. The oldest surviving double-entry records were created
in Italy during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (Lee, 1977; Sangster, 2016), from where double-entry
bookkeeping spread to the rest of the world over subsequent centuries (Gleeson-White, 2012).
In a modern exchange economy, recording transactions at Historical Cost likely works best when local con-
ditions vary, or when prices vary across a given market (Stigler, 1961). For example, gasoline prices can vary
considerably between locations a few miles apart, and consumers may consider whether the price savings at
a discount retailer oﬀset the time and gas costs of driving to a distant location. Similarly, shareholders would
likely want to reward managers based on how well they exploit local opportunities, which would be revealed
by the revenue-expense approach (Dichev, 2008). The revenue-expense approach is also crucial for fundamental
analysis by legendary investors such as Benjamin Graham, Warren Buﬀett and Joel Greenblatt (Lee, 2014).11
In contrast, records based on Fair Values would work better when there is little local price variation so
that the “market” looks like one assumed in neoclassical price theory – i. e., everyone knows the one price to
conduct a given transaction. Before accounting regulation, Fair Value accounting was used mainly by mutual
funds, which buy and sell securities on liquid exchanges, consistent with this argument. Indeed, unregulated
hedge funds still use Fair Value accounting. But even today, closed-end mutual funds often trade at a discount
or premium relative to their net asset value estimated on a Fair Value basis (Thompson, 1978), showing that
6
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Fair Value reports do not capture value for even these simplest ﬁrms. However, these discounts and premia
generally disappear when closed-end funds convert to open-end status, likely because open-end funds face
partial liquidation at net asset value due to fund withdrawals. In contrast, closed-end-fund shareholders can
only trade with each other but not with the fund. This evidence suggests that Fair Valuemeasurement provides
a better estimate of liquidation value than going-concern value for closed-end mutual funds (Basu, 2003), but
is thus less useful for tracing how and why a ﬁrm with permanently invested capital generates value as an
ongoing business (Ball, 1989; Penman, 2007).
5 Joint adaptations:Historical Cost andConservatism
By the early ﬁfteenth century, double-entry bookkeeping under Historical Cost was supplemented by Conser-
vatism in the form of asset impairments (Littleton, 1941; Penndorf, 1933). These impairments predate income
taxes (Vance, 1943) and the emergence of publicly traded equity and debt securities (Basu, 2009). Thus, impair-
ments were likely recorded for business purposes, especially since separate books were kept for property tax
purposes (Vance, 1943). Just as Crusoe found it useful to record places where crop yields were lower, we believe
that ﬁrms ﬁnd it useful to ﬂag unsuccessful transactions using asset impairments to avoid repeating them (or
similar transactions) in the future and incurring predictable losses.
Historical Cost and Conservatism are valuable because they jointly promote discovery by entrepreneurs of
feasible and desirable opportunities. Historical Cost accounting deﬁnes the set of past transactions that shapes
the set of possible future transactions, while Conservatism weeds out the undesirable transactions from this
set. Jointly, Historical Cost and Conservatism let a decision maker more fully specify the set of opportunities to consider in
making future investments given (possibly temporary) local conditions. The eﬀicient exploitation of local knowledge
in managing the ﬁrm improves market functioning when local conditions vary across ﬁrms and through time.
However, this argument only explains why these accounting principles are useful to entrepreneurs but does
not explain why they are useful to ﬁrms.
If the ﬁrm is a “going concern” in a costly contractingworld, thenmarket prices do not exist for at least some
of the items in the balance sheet and income statement (Ball, 1989), because ﬁrms would not exist if they could
easily be substituted for usingmarket transactions (Coase, 1937). The quasi-prices that ﬁrms use internallymust
diﬀer frommarket prices for the ﬁrm to survive. Ball (1989) uses this argument to explain thewidespread use of
standard costs, overhead cost allocation, accrual accounting, depreciation that departs from “economic depre-
ciation,” and auditing. More importantly, Ball (1989) uses this framework to explain why ﬁrms use Historical
Cost and Conservatism for contracting purposes. Managers often have private data about the expected net ben-
eﬁts from specialized assets but also have status, pay and career incentives to overstate these beneﬁts. Parties
dealing with the ﬁrm would like to be treated fairly (Ijiri, 1983) and not overpay based on biased estimates
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1986, p. 206). Assuming arms’-length transactions, Historical Cost records provide a
ﬂoor on the beneﬁts the manager expected when buying an asset, but does not include unveriﬁable gains (Ball,
1989). Auditors, who contract to provide useful data for other contracting parties, and keenly aware of man-
agerial incentives to overstate, only use managerial data in the ﬁrm’s accounts if they run against managers’
interests (Ball, 1989; Gao, 2013). Auditors follow a “lower-of-cost-or-market” rule for inventories (and traded
securities until recently) and accept asset write-downs but not write-ups by managers, recognizing unrealized
losses but not unrealized gains in income statements.12 Thus, Historical Cost and Conservatism jointly reduce
the potential agency costs arising from managers being better informed than other contracting parties. Braun
(this issue) ignores the contracting use of accounting principles because he abstracts away from all stewardship,
accountability and contracting issues.
6 Implications for accounting regulation
Our argument to this point is that the spread of better accounting principles helps ﬁrms to better adapt to
changing environments and possibly more variable environments. Fortunately, double-entry accounting has
evolved as a hierarchical complex system, which tend to adapt more quickly than non-hierarchical systems
(Simon, 1962). Humans have adapted to a wider range of climates and environments than any comparable
species through cultural transmission of knowledge (Boyd, Richerson & Henrich, 2011). Similarly, we argue
that more eﬀective accounting enlarges the set of identiﬁed feasible (and proﬁtable) transactions, which makes
economic environments more favorable for ﬁrms. Firms “shape” their environment similar to beavers building
dams or humans clearing forests.
7
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Conversely, misguided regulation can stall or reverse the usefulness of evolved accounting. Basu, Kirk, and
Waymire (2009) argue,
Accounting is likely an ecologically rational institution that coordinates economic interaction through
market exchange (Waymire, 2009; Waymire & Basu, 2007). To adapt a metaphor from Simon (1990), his-
torical cost accounting records and today’s exchange agreements are like two blades of scissors that
have become increasingly eﬀective together over time through co-evolution. Institutional changes such
as ‘fair value’ accounting that overwrites historical records of consummated transactions and erodes the
quality of memory inherent in records may make the scissors less eﬀective unless a matching blade is
produced [footnote omitted]. Contracts and regulations rely on a set of common expectations about how
performance is measured, and wholesale changes to this performance measure may entail ‘unintended
consequences.’ One ultimate consequence of less eﬀective recordkeeping may be the decay of economic
institutions responsible for wealth generation in modern developed societies.13
Consistent with this argument, nineteenth-century attempts to mandate Fair Value reporting in Germany
were quickly reversed once they were found to contribute to a ﬁnancial market bubble in the early 1870s (Hoﬀ-
mann & Detzen, 2013; Richard, 2005). The SEC blamed Fair Value reporting for the 1929 stock market crash
and warned against its use for decades (Walker, 1992). Demerjian (2011) documents that the FASB’s recent
advocacy of the balance-sheet approach and Fair Value measurement was followed by a rapid decline in the
use of balance-sheet-based covenants in debt contracts, consistent with the balance sheet numbers becoming
less informative. Benston and Hartgraves (2002) and Benston (2006) show that Enron’s adoption of Fair Value
measurement in managing its businesses contributed greatly to its eventual downfall. Allen and Carletti (2008)
and Plantin, Sapra, and Shin (2008) model how Fair-Value reporting can help ﬁnancial crises spread across
industries, presaging the recent economic crisis. Biondi (2015) uses agent-based models and experiments to
demonstrate that Fair-Value measurement exacerbates speculative bubbles relative to Historical Cost. Liter-
ature reviews to date do not identify Fair-Value measurement as a major cause of the recent ﬁnancial crisis
(Waymire & Basu, 2011). However, Fair-Value measurements may have induced contagion that intensiﬁed the
crisis (e. g. Dontoh et al., 2012; Khan, 2011).
Even though current accounting standards for ﬁnancial instruments mandate symmetric recognition of
unrealized gains and losses, Badia et al. (2017) report, “ﬁrms holding higher proportions of ﬁnancial instru-
ments measured at Level 2 and 3 fair values report more conditionally conservative comprehensive income
attributable to fair value measurements, consistent with ﬁrms trying to mitigate investors’ discounting of the
measurements.” This revealed preference shows that ﬁrms ﬁnd Conservative reporting better than mandatory
pure Fair-Value measurement.
Two decades of empirical research show that Conservatism is correlated with better ﬁrm outcomes in many
contexts (for literature reviews, see Artiach & Clarkson, 2011; Mora &Walker, 2015; Ruch & Taylor, 2015). Con-
servatism is associated with better corporate governance (e. g. Beekes, Pope & Young, 2004) and better invest-
ment outcomes (e. g. Bushman, Piotroski & Smith, 2011; Francis &Martin, 2010), consistent with Conservatism
aiding management of businesses. Conservatism is associated with more timely interventions by creditors fol-
lowing poor performance, protecting the interests of debtholders (Zhang, 2008). Conservative ﬁrms have lower
cost of debt (Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008; Zhang, 2008) and lower cost of equity (e. g. Garcia Lara, Garcia Osma
& Penalva, 2011), consistent with capital markets regarding ﬁrms with prudent accounting as less risky. Con-
servative ﬁrms are less likely to suﬀer stock price crashes (Kim & Zhang, 2016) and are sued less often by
shareholders and incur lower damages when sued (Ettredge, Huang & Zhang, 2016). Thus, empirical research
is quite strongly consistent with the survival value of Conservatism.
7 Concluding thoughts
Braun (this issue) extends and deepens prior arguments that traditional accounting principles like Historical
Cost and Conservatism reﬂect behavioral heuristics that have evolved to improve human survival prospects
over millions of years. His important new insight is that these principles help generate new private knowledge
that feeds into market prices and improves allocative eﬀiciency. This argument helps explain the survival of
Historical Cost and Conservatism from a systemic level. However, Braun (this issue) does not explain how
these accounting principles beneﬁt ﬁrms, which gave us a chance to push these arguments further.
Although opportunity cost is widely regarded as an important economic concept, it is easier to deﬁne the-
oretically than to apply in practice. Opportunity cost is not known or given to an entrepreneur, but must be
estimated by discovering and evaluating other courses of action. Accounting principles such as Historical Cost
and conditional Conservatism help entrepreneurs discover the expected net beneﬁts of diﬀerent choices by
evaluating the results of similar past choices. The “sunk cost fallacy” of economic theory, which encourages
8
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forgetting of past transactions, is optimal only in perfect markets. When the environment is uncertain and
knowledge scarce, ignoring the past in forecasting the future can be hugely maladaptive.
Combining accounting data frompast transactionswith those fromongoing transactions enables better fore-
casts of the proﬁts fromprospective transactions in an uncertainworld. Accounting principles such asHistorical
Cost and Conservatism, which are consistent with brain information processing, facilitate more proﬁtable in-
vestments (Dickhaut et al., 2010). Transactions based on better informed priors generate more informed prices
that in turn lead to greater allocative eﬀiciency and ultimately greater growth and prosperity. In contrast to our
information-based argument, Braun (this issue) relies on the endowment eﬀect to explain individuals’ attention
to sunk costs, and by analogy, ﬁrms’ attention to Historical Cost.
However, ﬁrms exist precisely because markets are incomplete and imperfect (Coase, 1937), and thus, the
internal quasi-prices used in the contracts that constitute the ﬁrm must diﬀer from market prices, if they even
exist (Ball, 1989; Sunder, 1997). Since managers are often better informed than other contracting parties, and
have incentives to overstate expected proﬁts, auditors use Historical Cost and conditional Conservatism to
mitigate upward earnings management. The resulting ﬁnancial statements are less biased, which improves
contracting eﬀiciency, and helps ﬁrms compete and survive in imperfect and incomplete markets. Thus, His-
torical Cost and Conservatism are valuable to individual entrepreneurs and capital providers as Braun (this
issue) contends, but also to the other contracting parties constituting a ﬁrm, whom he ignores. Finally, the
Fair Value measurement-based balance-sheet approach of accounting standard-setters, although optimal in a
zero-contracting cost world, is not ecologically rational in a costly contracting world and often generates worse
outcomes for entrepreneurs, ﬁrms and markets.
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Notes
1Traditionally, revenues are recognized when earned and realized (cash received) or realizable (likely to be received under contractual
terms), so Historical Cost accounting is broader than portrayed above. Similarly, not all unrealized losses are recognized in practice, so
U.S. accounting practice largely falls between the pure Historical Cost and pure Conditional Conservatism measurement bases described
above. Conservatism is categorized as Unconditional (e. g. immediate expensing) or Conditional (e. g. lower or cost or market) based on
whether the method uses data about new asset values (e. g. Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Basu 1997; 2005; Beaver & Ryan, 2005).
2However,Mises (1920) pointed out that if the government owned all themeans of production, there could be no prices for capital goods
as they would be transferred only within the government, which would reduce allocative eﬀiciency. In addition, government-protected
monopolies have little incentive to please customers via innovation. Hayek (1935) observed that the experts might be interested in their
own welfare above the public’s, in which case misaligned incentives would likely generate suboptimal outcomes (see also Mises, 1922, pp.
157–158).
3Garcia-Macia, Hsieh, and Klenow (2016) report that incumbents generated most of the U.S. growth over the last 40 years using data
from the U.S. Longitudinal Business Database for all non-farm private businesses. Furthermore, most growth occurs from improvement
of existing varieties by incumbents rather than introduction of new products by incumbents or entrants. Jones (1995) and Bloom et al.
(2016) report that new ideas are becoming harder to ﬁnd insofar as increasing numbers of researchers and scientists are being employed
but growth and productivity rates are slowing in industrialized countries in virtually all sectors.
4Government-protected labor unions limit worker competition by favoring seniority over merit in promotions and pay raises, and pro-
tecting incompetent workers from ﬁring. U.S. labor unions have been exempted from taxation, antitrust laws and many state laws and are
strongest in government and regulated industries such as utilities and transportation. As Hayek (1960, p. 267) observed, “We have now
reached a state where [unions] have become uniquely privileged institutions to which the general rules of law do not apply.” In the U.S.,
labor unions have discriminated against women, Chinese and black workers (e. g. Marshall, 1965). In Europe, unions control several board
seats through “codetermination,”which could increase eﬀiciency by blocking managerial opportunism (Smith, 1991). German codetermi-
nation has been found to have small eﬀects on productivity and proﬁtability with inconsistent signs (e. g. FitzRoy & Kraft, 2005; Gurdon
& Rai, 1990), although there are fewer industrial strikes.
5The Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1776) begins, “The annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the
necessaries and conveniencies of life which it annually consumes, andwhich consist always either in the immediate produce of that labour,
or in what is purchased with that produce from other nations.”
6Although Green (1894) introduced the label “opportunity cost,” Wieser (1914), pp. 199–200 articulated a broad ‘acquisitions-cost of
the entrepreneur’ that included not only explicit cash outlays for ‘production costs’ but also an interest charge for use of capital and “the
entire average wages of management, which he has a right to earn in similar enterprises; for again he would consider himself the loser, if
some particular activity did not yield him this income, or did not yield it fully.” The opportunity cost concept underlies the Bastiat (1848)
essay comparing “what is seen” or actually occurs with “what is not seen” but would have occurred if the current choice had not been
made (i. e. the counterfactual). Even earlier, Franklin (1746) starts his brief essay by saying, “Remember that Time is Money. He that can
earn Ten Shillings a Day by his Labour, and goes abroad, or sits idle one half of that Day, tho’ he spends but Sixpence during his Diversion
or Idleness, ought not to reckon That the only Expence; he has really spent or rather thrown away Five Shillings besides.”
7Parkin (2016, p. 19) argues that the value measure is ambiguous here since $50 is your value of seeing Dylan while $40 is the market
value of seeing Dylan and “the opportunity cost” might be interpreted as one of these values of seeing Dylan rather than the net value
9
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of $10 that Ferraro and Taylor (2005) argue is the indisputably correct answer. Ferraro and Taylor (2005, pp. 7–8) ran the survey again to
check the impact of this ambiguity by changing only the last sentence of the question to, “Based on this information, what is the minimum
amount (in dollars) you would have to value seeing Eric Clapton for you to choose his concert?” Even with the net value measure speciﬁed,
only 44 % (15 of a smaller sample of 34) of academic economists chose correctly.
8Smith (2003, p. 470) describes ecological rationality as follows: “Ecological rationality uses reason – rational reconstruction – to examine
the behavior of individuals based on their experience and folk knowledge, who are “naive” in their ability to apply constructivist tools
to the decisions they make; to understand the emergent order in human cultures; to discover the possible intelligence embodied in the
rules, norms, and institutions of our cultural and biological heritage that are created from human interactions but not by deliberate human
design. People follow rules without being able to articulate them, but they can be discovered.”
9Braun (this issue) relies on the endowment eﬀect (Thaler, 1980) to explain individuals’ use of sunk costs contrary to the predictions of
neoclassical economics, and then argues that Historical Cost measures sunk costs for ﬁrms. Braun (this issue) relies on prospect theory to
motivate the use of Historical Cost and Conservatism instead of Fair Values, whereas we argue that limited memory is an ultimate cause
of prospect theory and the attention to sunk costs.
10Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock (2016) report that users request historical accounting reports (primarily 10-Ks, 10-Qs and 8-Ks) from
EDGAR for complex ﬁrms with reporting discretion, especially after announcements of large unexpected losses and after stock price
crashes. Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock (2016, p. 448) argue, “Historical accounting reports, on the other hand, no longer contain news,
so their utility to investors is likely found in their ability to provide information that contextualizes and conditions information released
in the current period.” This conditional search for additional data to inform more diﬀicult choices seems inconsistent with a mechanical
endowment eﬀect as postulated by Braun (this issue).
11Lee (2014, pp. 389–390) argues that this is true because (i) accounting provides a language for forecasting, (ii) accounting provides an
ex-post settling-upmechanism, and (iii) accounting information is useful for forecasting because “although the GAAP accounting numbers
are related to exchange transactions that have already taken place, they provide a wealth of information for making forecasts about the
future” (p. 390). Lee (2014) argues that historical data contain useful information rather than being used merely because of an endowment
eﬀect.
12Banker, Basu, and Byzalov (2017) report that asset impairments incorporate data frommultiple performance indicators in economically
sensible ways such as aligning the time horizons of indicators and the useful lives of assets. Byzalov and Basu (2016) report that auditors
use disaggregated internal performance data (e. g. quarterly and segment income) in their impairment decisions, which is sensible if assets
are tested for impairment in a disaggregated manner at the segment level (goodwill), pool level (inventory) or at the individual level
(buildings). Both papers show that auditors give additional weight to consistent negative signals (i. e. over and above their individual
weights as independent negative signals) when impairing assets, so asset impairments are credible indicators of poor expected cash ﬂows.
13Very pertinent to our discussion here, Simon (1990, p. 7) originally wrote, “Human rational behavior (and the rational behavior of
all physical symbol systems) is shaped by a scissors whose two blades are the structure of task environments and the computational
capabilities of the actor.” Our socioeconomic environments are riddled with uncertainty and hidden incentives, while economic agents
have limited memory and computing ability.
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